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Abstract 
What is an explanation? The popular responses are: We can explain what a word 
means, how to run a computer programme, why John decided to marry Jane, and even 
historical facts like the extinction of the dinosaurs. But what about explananda such as 
the linguistic entity “Who saw John?”. The paper surveys a spectrum of responses, 
some theory-free, others theory-bound. For all of these, we employ the six 
Dimensions of explanation.  
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1. Introduction  
The Induction/ Deduction dichotomy runs right through the story. Successive 
Induction results in Universals/ Typology. Postulating Universals leads to Deduction 
(from Popper to Duhem, assuming the near victory of Deduction). For some, the 
Methodology of contemporary science is NOT applicable to language, which needs 
only inductive procedures e.g. under structuralism. For others, YES, it is applicable, 
and the winner is the (bio)-linguistic one. But the winner doesn‟t take it all! Other 
orientations produce other insights; e.g., from Stratification to Cognition (which 
requires another paper!). Another question that arises concerns the merger of models, 
e.g. Optimality Theory and Minimalist Program, which potentially deepens 
explanation. Finally, we could consider the revision of the “Language is well-
designed” hypothesis, by adding the question “primarily for what?”. 
 
2. The Dimensions of explanation  
2.1 Theme 1. Early views: The beginning of the long-term swings of the pendulum, 
Induction versus Deduction 
If we begin with hidden Universals (recall Plato‟s Cave analogy/ allegory), we can 
deduce from them the observables. The priority of such Universals is re-asserted in 
the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas, and also the Modistae. Alternatively, we reach 
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Universals by successive induction from the surface forms, as in Aristotle, going from 
particulars to surface Universals or Typology. Induction is re-asserted under 
Nominalism in the Middle Ages, championed by William of Occam (see below).  
Medieval accounts include: (a) Friar Roger Bacon who supposedly introduced the 
empirical study of the sciences, breaking with the then-current slavish adherence to 
authorities. (b) The Modists: The Modists were Speculative/ Universal grammarians, 
in late C13 in Northern Europe, centered on Paris. Systematized by Thomas of Ehrfurt 
(early C14), Modism replaced traditional descriptive/ pedagogical grammars (Thrax 
for Greek, Prician for Latin). The three Modes are: of being, of understanding, and of 
signifying. (i) First are the Modes of being: Ontological hierarchies of the things 
themselves – a very rich system, partly derived from Aristotle. (ii) Then, the Modes of 
understanding/ thinking – the mental acts of signifying. (iii) Finally, the Modes of 
signifying encode properties/ meanings into language. Here falls grammar (almost) as 
we understand the term. Modism was itself replaced by (again, inductivist) 
Nominalism, represented here by William of Occam (yes, the monk with the famous 
razor). 
Jumping to the Renaissance, the pendulum swings again. From Galileo we see a 
new rejection of Inductivism, in favour of hidden universals. Add to that Descartes‟ 
Rationalism and influence on the Port Royal Grammar. Cf. also the (ambiguous) 
stance of Isaac Newton (1687): (a) “I don‟t invent hypotheses”; but (b) “I deduced 
that…”.  
The pendulum swings back with Sir Francis Bacon‟s insistence on induction and 
the dominance of experimentation as the basis of scientific method (cf. Roger Bacon, 
above). For C18-C19, one can mention only W. von Humboldt (1836) (Chomsky‟s 
„last Cartesian‟ – but perhaps not!). Characteristic for this period are: (a) Comparative 
studies (cf. later in the Neo-Grammarians); (b) Foundations of Structuralism; (c) 
Language diversity is taken back to Universal types; (d) The influence of language on 
the mentality of its speakers.  
Jumping to the Neogrammarians and de Saussure down to Bloomfield: Here we 
revert to Induction again, with their resultant surface, true Typologies. Note that, so 
far, apart from the hints in the (Descartes-influenced) Grammaire general, we have 
grammars, but no theory of language or even of syntax, until the C20, below. 
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2.2 Theme 2. The interaction with C.20 Philosophy of Science  
The spectrum runs from Popper to Duhem, each contributing specific offerings, often 
problems too! The first, chronologically, and the most famous of them all, is Karl 
Popper (See Popper 1935, 1963). Popper replaced Inductivism (“we can never prove a 
theory is correct by simply adding more data”), and introduced the notion 
Falsification. Two important Popperian criteria are the following (assuming a 
deductive theory, followed by testing the validity of what is predicted): (a) ONE test 
is enough to falsify a theory (but see Lakatos and Duhem on crucial experiments, 
below); (b) The new theory must cover ALL the previous explicanda! (but: 
contradictions drawn from idealisations, new priorities, etc., in Chomsky, elaborated 
in Drachman 1981). Perhaps there are real cases of Popperian refutation, e.g. the fall 
of phlogiston (Lavoisier 1777) and Vitalism (Woehler 1828), each case presumably 
depending on falsifying a single claim. Simply put: for Phlogiston (Priestley 1774-
1776), “to be combustible, a material must contain phlogiston”. However, in fact, 
combustion simply needs an oxygen-rich environment. Lavoisier proved this in 1777. 
For Vitalism, take the single claim: “you can‟t make urea from non-organic stuff”. 
(But Woehler (1828) did just that).
1
  
For my second “hero”, I take Kuhn (1970) on revolution, an end-case in the 
evolution of a science towards higher degrees of explanation. Lavoisier changed the 
paradigm of explanation for chemistry at a blow. Chomsky did the same for 
linguistics (See Newmeyer 1986 for a positive appraisal).  
My third “hero” is Lakatos (1970), on Research programs as the background for 
explanation, (Cf. Boeckx 2006). These consist of theory plus auxiliary hypotheses. 
Useful „ad hoc‟ hypotheses temporarily protect a theory from falsification, provided it 
is not already degenerate (progress-less!). For the phlogiston saga (see above): for 
some metals, combustion resulted in diminished weight (by loss of phlogiston), but 
for other metals it resulted in increased weight (crucially, of course, not by a loss of 
phlogiston). Its supporters held that phlogiston can have negative weight, so its loss 
by burning leads to an increase in weight. On the other hand, Lavoisier showed the 
gain to result from the absorption of oxygen from the air. Cf. also Seuren (1998) who 
accuses Chomsky of deliberately immunizing his theory with ad hoc hypotheses.  
                                                          
1
 Note also (a) Koyre‟s influence on his students Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend (see Koyre 1957), and 
(b) Psychologist Lewin‟s (1935) (Cassirer 1923 inspired) contrast between Galileo‟s „hidden‟ laws/ 
universals and Aristotelian „observables‟. 
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As a fourth example, one can refer to Hempel (1965) and the still-current four part 
formalized model of explanation. The Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model includes 
Laws, Boundary conditions, derivations, outputs (Cf. 2.4 where we will come to an 
application to linguistics).  
Fifth, we could recall Laudan (1977) on evolution by jettisoning and thus making 
explanation more transparent. He claimed: “The unrejectable core of a research 
tradition evolves when apparently essential elements can be jettisoned without 
compromising the problem-solving success of the tradition”. Cf. Occam‟s Razor! 
Note that re-orientation may require the sacrifice of earlier-explained data (Drachman 
1981). Recall also the way Chomsky‟s Minimalist Program (1995) jettisoned (e.g.) 
Phrase-structure (X-bar), the levels of Deep and Surface Structure, traces and co-
indexing, even c-command, while introducing the more principled elements such as 
Merge, Agree and Phase (for efficient computation), and the two Interfaces – (for 
sound/ gesture and (some of) meaning).  
For our last “hero”, take Duhem (1914/1954), again emphasizing holism (“the 
programme”) as a precondition for explanatory power. Two new points in Duhem‟s 
view: (a) Since, however extensive, the data always underdetermine the possible 
explanations, recursive induction is again dis-favoured; (b) No single experiment on a 
single hypothesis is decisive (a consequence of holism in science – vs. Popper (1935, 
1963), and resumed from Lakatos (1970)).  
 
2.3 Theme 3. For many, language was NOT an object of scientific enquiry  
Chomsky (2012/2013) asserts, citing Joos (1957): By mid-century, many adopted the 
view that languages can “differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable 
ways” and therefore the study of each language must be approached “without any 
preexistent scheme of what a language must be.” For these “many”, there are only 
reduction-procedures and statistics, as in the following (from those mentioned in 
Chomsky 2012/2013, here listed chronologically): De Saussure (1916), Sapir (1921), 
Bloomfield (1933), Trubetzkoy (1969), Harris (1951), Joos (1957), Quine (1960), 
Greenberg (1963). For these, we will adopt the motto: “No Theory, no Science!”. 
 
2.4 Theme 4. Language IS an object for science  
Here we assert the opposite position. We come to the Generative beginnings, even 
before 1957, adding now the biology paradigm, from Lenneberg (1967) and Chomsky 
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(1968). Explanation evolved through successive simplifications in Chomsky‟s works. 
We go through the increasing explanatory power in Syntactic Structures, Binding, 
Principles and Parameters, the expanding biological background under the Minimalist 
Program.  
For explanation, recall that the mid-fifties gave us Chomsky‟s (1957) Syntactic 
Structures, the earliest version of Generative Grammar. As early as the mid-1960s, 
three levels of adequacy of a theory were mooted, as in Chomsky‟s (1965) Aspects. 
These were: observational, descriptive, and explanatory adequacy. Recall also some 
of the later mergers and other simplifications leading to increased explanatory power, 
from the evolution of T-markers and constructions to the part-merger of Morphology 
with syntax, under Laudan, in Theme 2 above. 
(a) T-markers of TG give way to recursive PSG > to X-bar > to bare PS; 
(b) Constructions > merge within general functions; 
(c) D and S structures disappear. Unification of residues of PSG and TG; 
(d) Principles and Parameters (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993); 
(e) Minimalist Program;  
(f) One place for generation of Syntax and parts of Morphology, viz the syntax – as 
in Marantz (2001, 2005) and Borer (2005). 
Coming now to the linguistic interpretation of Hempel‟s model, as promised. 
Under Chomsky (1995) Minimalist Program, we could mention a 2011 article by 
Epstein et al. I will present here first the Hempel‟s schema, and a sample syntactic 
derivation, e.g. for “Who saw John?” [Bracketed numbers in (b) are from Epstein et 
al. 2011 on Derivation]. 
 
(a) Formal schema for Hempel (1965). 
 L1 L2 L3…Ln The Universal Laws – at least one must cover the fact 
involved 
 B1 B2 B3…Bn The Boundary conditions – those relevant must be met 
 ---------------- The Logical Deduction sequence 
 E The Explanandum (the fact to be explained)  
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(b) The derivation of “Who saw John?”. 
Phase 1 = v*P cycle, with seven processes [but two (2ii, iii) apply in parallel].  
(1) Triple External Merge (EM) makes the following structure:  
 [v*p  who [v*  V [VP see John ]]] 
(2) (i) Feature transmission (unvalued phi from v* to V (see); 
 (ii) Agree: values unvalued phi on V (see), and unvalued Case on NP 
(John); 
 (iii) Internal Merge (IM): raises NP (John) to SpecVP;  
 (iv) Transfer to the interfaces: v*P to SEM, and VP to PHON. 
Phase 2 = CP cycle, with 7 processes, [but three (4b, c, d) apply in parallel] 
(3) Double EM: Merge T, Merge C (makes CP structure) 
(4) (i) Feature transmission (unvalued phi from C to T); 
 (ii) Agree: values unvalued phi on T, and unvalued Case on NP (who); 
 (iii) IM: raises NP-who to SpecTP; 
 (iv) IM: raises NP-who to SpecCP, giving:  
 [CP who3 [c‟ C[TP who2 [T‟ T [v*P  who1 [v* V* --]]]]]] 
 (v) Transfer to the interfaces: CP* to SEM, and CP to PHON.  
(c) Initial/ Boundary conditions.  
We illustrated the Laws (e.g. Merge, Agree, Phase) in the derivations above. We 
should add the relevant Boundary conditions under Minimalist Program, e.g. Merge is 
binary, No Tampering, No New Features, Full Interpretation, Phase Impenetrability. 
Epstein et al. raise the question, whether we can justify such a high degree of 
complexity for such a simple sentence as “Who saw John?”. The authors confidently 
respond: “A principled system, being explicit and falsifiable, may well yield intricate-
looking derivations, i.e. simple (explanatory) laws can give rise to complex 
phenomena (= science)”. 
Reasonably assuming that Chomsky is basically the winner, now consider the 
caveat under Theme 5 below. 
 
2.5 Theme 5. A Caveat: Explanations from alternative theories 
Does the winner (Chomsky) take it all? Not necessarily, according to Feyerabend 
(1975). To justify this caveat, we would have to look for explanatory insights 
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derivable from (e.g.) Stratification (in Lamb 1966), Formal Logic (in Montague 
1970), Function (in van Dijk 1972), Construction (in Croft 2001), Cognition (in 
Langacker 1990) [but that would take another paper!]. 
But we must even consider a further possibility, that of program-merger. The three 
such accounts that follow in fact seek to formulate Minimalism-compatible hybrid 
programs, as their titles indeed indicate: 
(a) Smolenskly (2000): Connectionism and Optimality Theory; 
(b) Samek-Lodovici (2006): Optimality Theory and Minimalism. One can maintain 
Minimalist Program goals, yet pursue an Optimality Theory perspective of human 
grammar. Invoking Optimality Theory allows for the interaction of constraints at the 
interface with PF and LF as explanation of language variation. 
(c) Broekhuis & Woolford (2013): Minimalism and Optimality Theory. Chomsky 
asserts that Minimalism is a research program –not a theory– investigating to what 
extent the language faculty is optimally design to satisfy conditions at the interface 
with the sensory-motor system (PF) and the system of thought (LF). Optimality 
Theory is a theory of how universal constraints of grammar interact. The last-
mentioned authors assume, however, that Minimalism lacks a well-developed 
Evaluation mechanism, while Optimality Theory lacks a well-developed Generator; 
they then propose to merge the two well-formed elements, the resulting hybrid taking 
advantage of the explanatory powers of both research programs. 
 
2.6 Theme 6. Enter language design and explanation! Is language optimally 
designed, and for what? 
For Chomsky (1995) the grammar IS the explanation – so far so good. But now, in his 
2013 paper he adds “Is language optimally designed for Communication?”. There are 
arguments against communication. Output constraints are in fact an extra burden on 
perception. Chomsky now remarks on some of the elements relevant to this anti-
communication claim:  
“In general, so it appears, structurally ambiguous, garden path, and island 
structures result from free functioning of the simplest rules, yielding difficulties for 
perception.”.  
 (Chomsky 2013: 41) 
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We must also countenance diversity in surface morpheme order, e.g. of 
derivational versus inflectional affixes, not to forget phonology-sponsored Tense-to-
Root morpheme movement in Modern Greek, for which consider the set of forms:  
(5)  (i) √κáno „I do/make‟, Past √é-kana „I did/made‟;  
 but compare the derived forms: 
 (ii) √para-káno „I overdo‟, Past *e-parákana √par-é-kana „I overdid‟ 
 
3. Conclusions  
The dimensions of explanation reviewed: We witnessed the basic methodological 
contrast between (a) Induction, the derivation from the data to (surface-true) 
Universals, in science and language (from Aristotle to Harris, from de Saussure to 
Trubetzkoy), and (b) Deduction, the derivation from „hidden‟ Universals to the data 
(from Plato to Modists, Descartes, von Humboldt, Chomsky).  
Is language an object of science? (a) many said NO! Languages are unendingly 
disparate (Joos) – no theory, no science! (b) Others said YES, with Chomsky. Merger 
of Minimalism and Optimality may result in deeper explanatory adequacy. For 
Chomsky (1995), language IS well-designed for the satisfaction of conditions at the 
interface with the sensory-motor system (PF) and the system of thought (LF).  
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